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Special Commentary

The Compound Security Dilemma:
Threats at the Nexus of War and Peace
Isaiah Wilson III and Scott A. Smitson
© Isaiah Wilson III and Scott A. Smitson

ABSTRACT: The United States faces compound security threats
today reflecting a paradigm shift in the character of global
geopolitical competition. Arraying these threats against liabilities in
strategic and policy frameworks poses a significant, unacknowledged
challenge: a new compound security dilemma. This compound security
dilemma demands compound solutions that recognize, adapt, and
embrace the multipolar ecosystem and its global political, cultural,
economic, health, and competitive dynamics.

T

oday’s tumultuous global security environment is best
characterized as one of contagious, disruptive change—
converging, transregional, compound security threats, a
pathological weakening of nation-states, and arguably a breakdown of
the Western liberal order itself. A variety of security threats driven by
cultural, political, and historical forces have combined in ways that have
fundamentally altered the character of threat and the environment of
global geopolitical competition, confronting US policymakers with a
compound security dilemma heretofore unacknowledged. Traditional
security concerns have now merged with human health and security
issues due to the interconnected nature of our twenty-first century
world, as painfully exemplified by the current pandemic. Foreign policy
concerns have acquired a keen domestic focus while domestic policy
concerns have received global attention.
The policies of a revanchist Russia, continuing conflicts in
Syria and Iraq, and instability in Venezuela all provide compelling,
geographically diverse, and comprehensive examples of the compound
security threats faced by the United States today. Accordingly, US
strategists need a theory and analytics-informed network model that
can highlight the nexes between drivers of instability, horizontally
and vertically and between ecosystems. By describing compound
security threats, the underlying compound security dilemma that
generates these threats, the resulting policy puzzles, and by providing
several examples, we offer the requisite foundations for a theory with
significant utility for military strategy and force planning today and
tomorrow. This special commentary is prerequisite and preamble to a
larger, subsequent research theory-building project focused on further
development and testing of the general governing dynamics of the
compound security dilemma.
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Compound Security Threats, Defined

The coronavirus provides a window into understanding the
compound threats of today. At the time of this writing, the United
States still confronts this deadly adversary, one that flouts accepted
international laws and conventions regarding warfare and human
security protections. This adversary has already achieved mass societal
disruption at an alarming speed. Within three months this enemy
inflicted over 152,000 casualties (confirmed cases) resulting in over
5,700 deaths globally.1 Worldwide economic market disruptions now
threaten a global recession, and national publics now question the
responsiveness of their governments’ capacity and even willingness to
contain and mitigate the adversary. The second-, third-, and nth-order
damage across all sectors—political, economic, societal, foreign and
domestic—are as yet incalculable. The potential for a global paradigm
shift in the way we perceive these threats is real.
Some readers may ask, why choose to speak of COVID-19 in
terms more appropriate to traditional warfare—why speak of a global
pandemic as a global, epoch-changing war? This moment is beyond the
metaphorical: we are, in fact, at war against this virus, or at least we
should be because COVID-19 is indicative of the changed nature of
many of today’s threats.2
Many contemporary threats have become compounded largely
because their root causes and underlying conditions (or currents) have
been allowed to persist unaddressed or under-addressed (see figure 1).
These causes and conditions include economic imbalances; sectarian
conflict; massive and sudden demographic shifts due to regional conflict,
climate change, and insecurity; loss of trust in governing institutions;
and border concerns inextricably tied to identity. The repercussions
of these compound threats follow a multiplicative—or exponentially
contagious—progression as opposed to an additive, linearly sequential
one typical of traditional threats. Hence these repercussions dramatically
alter the risk calculus, risk reward, and benefits-to-costs factors so critical
to strategy planning and policy decision-making.
The combination—or more accurately compounding—of global
dynamics such as wealth disparities, widening wealth and inequality gaps,
instabilities and unpredictabilities in the global economic market, and
global climate change (to varying degrees, artifacts of globalization) have
resulted in what strategic forecasters have described as an environment
of “constant tension between greater interdependence and intensifying
competition” for increasingly scarce material and high-value resources.3
1. “Trump Tests Negative; World Lockdown Takes Hold,” Bloomberg News, March 14, 2020,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-14/widespread-clampdown-takes-hold
-spanish-emergency-virus-update.
2. Katie Glueck and Sydney Ember, “Joe Biden and Bernie Sanders Rebuke Trump Over Virus:
‘The Clock Is Ticking,’” New York Times, March 12, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12
/us/politics/joe-biden-coronavirus.html.
3. Development Concepts and Doctrine Center (DCDC), The DCDC Global Strategic Trends
Programme: 2007-2036, 3rd ed. (London: UK Ministry of Defence DCDC, January 2007), https://
www.cuttingthroughthematrix.com/articles/strat_trends_23jan07.pdf.

Special Commentary

Wilson and Smitson 7

Figure 1. The compound security threat

In combination these environmental dynamics are the first, most
fundamental and consequential of the major drivers of disruptive change
shaping today’s global security environment and place new stresses on
the long-standing liberal international system. Behavioral changes in
international relations caused by these changes reflect an ongoing shift
from a balance-of-power model of geopolitical competition to one of
instability and unpredictability. In essence this shift marks a return
to pre-World War I geo-mercantilism with “beggar-thy-neighbor”
behaviors that foster go-it-alone and do-it-your-own-way approaches to
solving security dilemmas.4
Veteran US National Security Council and State Department senior
policy adviser Ambassador Richard Haass has dubbed this development a
return to a “self-help” system of international competition.5 This system
4. See Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s.v. “Beggar-thy-neighbor policy” by Peter Bondarenko,
August 18, 2017, https://www.britannica.com/topic/beggar-thy-neighbor-policy.
5. Richard Haass, A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order (New
York: Penguin Press, 2017).
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makes forming and norming—holding together capable and willing
coalitions for collective security and defense—more difficult while also
making the formation of such coalitions more essential. As nation-states
drift toward their own self-help solutions to solve security dilemmas,
they are less likely to treat such dilemmas as collective problems.
This brings us to the issue of the threats themselves. In many respects
these threats are more daunting than those of the Cold War. Historian
Walter Russell Mead described the changed character of geopolitical
competition in this way:
Sometime in 2013, we reached a new stage in world history. A coalition
of great powers has long sought to overturn the post-Cold War Eurasian
settlement that the United States and its allies imposed after 1990; in the
second half of 2013 that coalition began to gain ground. . . . The big three
challengers—Russia, China and Iran—all hate, fear and resent the current
state of Eurasia. The balance of power it enshrines thwarts their ambitions;
the norms and values it promotes pose deadly threats to their current
regimes. . . . increasingly, they think they have found a way to challenge and
ultimately to change the way global politics work.6

The major nation-state challengers (China, Russia, North Korea,
and Iran) identified in the 2018 National Defense Strategy share
common denominators as emerging threats: all represent illiberal
states led by despots driven by anachronistic-world-order motives and
hypernativist and statist philosophies and ideologies. The hard choices of
the global system’s leading power, the United States, regarding whether
and, perhaps more importantly, how to intervene in world affairs will
matter most. This behavioral driver of change, also known as American
Interventionism, is the second major driver of disruptive change for
the future global security environment. Since compound threats
demand nothing less than compound solutions, only by developing an
understanding of the compound security dilemma posed by compound
security threats can we open the door to lasting, compound solutions.

Compound Security Threats under a “New” Compound Security
Dilemma

The term compounded refers to the increased interaction—
interconnectedness and collision—of otherwise once separate policy
issues, reflecting a new, post–Cold War (and now post-9/11) international
security environment.7 Where there was once a brighter line dividing
policy issues of a limited domestic context and scope of impact and
consequence from broader international policy concerns, the division
between the national and the international is less relevant and less viable
today.
6. Walter Russell Mead, “The End of History Ends,” American Interest, December 2, 2013,
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/12/02/2013-the-end-of-history-ends-2/.
7. See Hugh Liebert, John Griswold, and Isaiah Wilson III, eds., Thinking beyond Boundaries:
Transnational Challenges to U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); and
Isaiah Wilson III and James J. F. Forest, eds., Handbook of Defence Politics: International and Comparative
Perspectives (New York: Routledge, July 1, 2009).
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The security dilemma of the twentieth century international
environment—defined primarily by physical, material-based security
threats of a military (martial) nature—has now given way to a new
twenty-first century security dilemma, the compound security
dilemma.8 Traditional security concerns over material resources are less
and less divorceable from issues of human security. Matters of health
and biological contagion, once easily and accurately recognized and not
considered domestic security issues, today are merely parts of a larger
and more complicated “global health security” whole in a compound
security dilemma world. The novel coronavirus global pandemic could
not be a more accurate example.

Core Governing Dynamics
A number of core dynamics govern this compound security
dilemma. First, shocks in one traditionally distinct public policy sector
such as economics have cascading effects on other sectors also related
to human security. With little or no warning, a matter of oil supply and
demand can turn into a regional or worldwide security concern, even
predatory conflict. The competition for energy is a clear example of
this compound security dilemma. Competition for energy supplies will
continue to dominate the economic landscape during the next 30 years
and growth in world energy demand is likely to rise annually by between
1.5 and 3.1 percent. This trend is likely to result in highly competitive
pricing and the continued enrichment and economic progress, as well as
predation, of producer countries including Russia and Iran.9 Concepts of
domestic politics and policies such as energy policy and migration policy
now take on a global context: we now must think of these policy issues
and concerns in a security context.
The new compound security dilemma questions the foundational
logic of the traditional security dilemma while also calling for an
entirely new governing logic. It thus raises central questions of scale
and legitimacy regarding preferred unilateral policy approaches over
multilateral options (from an instrumental solvency as well as ideational
sovereignty standpoint).
Another governing dynamic of the compound security dilemma is
the tragedy of scales problem. In the past, policy treatment approaches
to planning, decision-making, and implementation were designed
and optimized toward efficiency metrics, calibrated around responsemitigate-recovery public policy standard operating processes and
procedures. The contagion qualities of compound security threats,
however, outgrow and outpace traditional policy prescriptions given
their exponential growth characteristics.
An additional feature of the compound security dilemma is the
interaction effect at play between simultaneous and overlapping
8. John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2, no. 2
(1950): 157–180, https://doi.org/10.2307/2009187.
9. DCDC, Global Strategic Trends.

10

Parameters 50(2) Summer 2020

sources of instability. The manifestations of these threats derive their
character from this interaction between variables; the effect is (at least)
multiplicative not additive in nature (see table 1). This tendency of the
compound security threat to outpace the capacity of policy response
options is just as apt to the COVID-19 pandemic as it is to the rise of
ISIS, the Afghanistan War, the crises in the Middle East, the compound
threat in Venezuela, and numerous other nexes of conflict that manifest
at geopolitical flashpoints.
Table 1. Comparison of security paradigms
Conventional Paradigm

Compound Security Paradigm

Threat Calculation

A+B+C

AxBxC

Threat Manifestation

Divergent or Convergent

Convergent

The compound security dilemma, similar to the paradox of the
wicked problem, features poorly and undertimed treatments to threats
that do not solve or mitigate but rather metastasize those threats at
accelerative rates. This effect heightens the risks of miscalculation,
mis-signaling, and runaway crisis escalation. Further, the actions of our
adversaries generate and exploit compound security threats deliberately
and strategically along the gaps and seams of traditional geographic
combatant command boundaries. The geography of compound threats
is an essential calculus in strategic planning, force planning, and risk
management and mitigation.

The Russia Compound Security Threat
Russia now leads a systematic assault on Western democracies and
the international system founded on Western liberal values. Putin’s Russia
aims to subvert Western democracies internally, spread anti-NATO and
anti–European Union sentiment, and undermine the rules-based liberal
international order.
Russia’s revanchist tendencies and expansionism are most easily seen
in its physical military presence along the traditional and historically
vital nexus of its territorial and ethno-cultural near abroad. As the 1990s
and 2000s witnessed a Western liberal states’ expansionism in various
forms, including an expanded NATO eastward and southward, the
2010s and teens watched a precipitous spread of a Russian sphere of
influence westward and southward. Russia’s recent involvement in the
Syrian conflict can be seen as a continuance of this trajectory. The two
geostrategic pathways are clearly moving in counterpoising directions
leading to an inevitable, though not necessarily obvious, clash, possibly
an epochal one.
For years, Russia has worked to gain influence in southeast Europe,
first and foremost using Serbia, later Kosovo, and more recently Bosnia,
as footholds to establish friendly pockets on a hostile continent at a
historical geopolitical pivot that sits along a major civilizational fault line.
Russia has violated the borders of nearby nations and seeks to shatter
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NATO and change European and Middle East security and economic
structures to its favor. The use of emerging technologies to discredit and
subvert democratic processes is concern enough but when this behavior
is coupled with Russia’s expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenal, the
challenge is clear.10
At present, Russian activity is aggressive, focused, and directed.
Russia is also engaging in expeditions far beyond its historic near
abroad, bringing even broader geostrategic implications. Russian
involvement in Syria should be viewed as expanding anti-access/
area-denial posture in the eastern Mediterranean, greater Levant, and
the Sinai Peninsula. Russian gray-zone warfare activities in Syria are
complicating and strangling European attempts at pressure on Russia
regarding the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine. Finally, Russia’s
cybermanipulations of elections threaten the legitimacy and viability of
electoral systems in democratic and democratizing countries, including
the leading and guaranteeing power of the Western liberal community
of democratic states, the United States.

The ISIL and “Syraq” Compound Security Threat
On June 9, 2014, the self-declared Islamic State breached and erased
the international boundary separating Syria and Iraq, making the crises
in Syria and in Iraq compound into one so-called Syraq. The vital
national security interests of the United States did not necessarily fall
within one or both nation-states, rather it fell across their nexus. Syraq
as such is not simply a civil war. It is a compound war—a composite of
at least three wars and possibly a fourth. The first is the Syrian Civil War
in which Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, using primarily conventional
forces, has brutally murdered hundreds of thousands of Syrian people.11
The second is the Syrian insurgency against the Assad regime. In this
part of the conflict, insurgents have been trained and resourced by a
multitude of different countries anxious to see Assad removed from
power. The third is the international war against the Islamic State and
other transregional terrorist organizations.
Arguably there is a fourth war in which the major combatants are
weaponizing refugees by causing mass migration into southern Europe,
metastasizing a threat to NATO member states in southern Europe and
to the internal stability of the EU. This crisis is a form of war that many
still fail to see as such; it is precisely a continuation of politics by other
means with vectored, forced migrations aimed at overburdening and

10. James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of
Defense, 2018), https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense
-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
11. “Syria: Events of 2018,” Human Rights Watch, accessed May 5, 2020, https://www.hrw
.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/syria.
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eventually “breaking the nations” of Europe.12 And it is part of Russia’s
deliberate strategy of disruption.13

The Venezuela Compound Security Threat
Even before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Venezuela
experienced increased deterioration of the rule of law and an expansion
of illicit activities, especially narcotics. Additionally, Venezuela continues
to face a worsening humanitarian crisis, the continued collapse of its
health sector, and greater food insecurity.
Venezuela is also faced with a worsening economic crisis beyond
the effects being created by the current US sanctions regime. As the
COVID-19 pandemic has taken hold bringing economic activity to a
halt across the globe, an oil price war has unfolded—a byproduct of
the failure by Saudi Arabia and Russia to come to a mutual collective
agreement on supply cuts, resulting in an oversupplied market. The
resulting drop in oil prices carries potentially dire implications for
oil-exporting Latin American economies, several of which rely on oil
revenues for substantial shares of their budgets.
The crisis in Venezuela is driving the largest exodus of refugees in
recent history in Latin America—almost 4.5 million as accounted for
the by the United Nations in May.14 Additional projections estimate that
by mid-2020, Venezuela will surpass Syria as the largest humanitarian
crisis in the world.15 While numerous organizations like the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees and the US Agency for International
Development are attempting to mitigate the effects of this crisis, neighbor
states like Colombia and Brazil (two major US strategic partners) are at
risk of exceeding their ability to absorb and support this mass exodus.
This challenge will only be compounded as the effects of COVID-19
impact the region.
Finally, the instability of Venezuela also has geostrategic implications
for the United States. Already a major platform of influence prior to the
COVID-19 outbreak, Venezuela is the lens through which Russia and
China continue to prioritize their efforts in Latin America.
While China continues to use its Belt and Road Initiative to gain access
and influence throughout the region, China has also heavily invested in
critical infrastructure, establishing “dual use” ports at key geostrategic

12. Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (New York:
Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003).
13. Geoff Dyer, “NATO Accuses Russia of ‘Weaponising’ Immigrants,” Financial Times, March
1, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/76a52430-dfe1-11e5-b67fa61732c1d025.
14. “Venezuela Situation,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, accessed May 4,
2020, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/venezuela-emergency.html.
15. Dany Bahar and Meagan Dooley, Venezuela Refugee Crisis to Become the Largest and Most
Underfunded in Modern History, Brookings, December 9, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog
/up-front/2019/12/09/venezuela-refugee-crisis-to-become-the-largest-and-most-underfunded-in
-modern-history/.
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choke points including Panama.16 These actions as well as the significant
influence that China retains on the future of Venezuela is demonstrative
of a broader pattern across the Western Hemisphere as stated by the US
Southern Command Commander, Admiral Craig Faller, in a January
2020 testimony to the US Senate Armed Services Committee:
I look around the region and I see China working on multiple port deals, IT
infrastructure, dams, mining, logging, fishing, including a significant illegal
fishing, illegal mining and illegal logging. And I look at the port access that
they’re pursuing in El Salvador, Jamaica, Bahamas. I ask myself the question
why would China want to buy an island and lock up a 99-year lease for
most of the coast of El Salvador, right here within a two-hour flight of the
continental United States. They are trying to achieve positional advantage
right here in our neighborhood and that is alarming and concerning to me.
It drives the sense of urgency with which I look at this competition.17

Whereas as Chinese interests in Venezuela are a blend of
geoeconomics-meets-geostrategy, Russia’s interests in Venezuela are
weighted toward its increased role and visibility within the military
dimension of its power.
Given Havana’s outsized role and influence in Caracas, Venezuela is
a major fulcrum for Russia’s approach to Latin America. Venezuela and
Cuba are two of Russia’s three key allies in the Western Hemisphere,
and Venezuela accounts for 80 percent of Russia’s foreign military sales
program. Venezuela has been a frequent end point for Russian longrange bomber sorties into and out of the Western Hemisphere; it hosts
Russian navy port visits and exercises; and it serves as a major platform for
Russia’s ongoing information warfare campaign across Latin America.
Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia has signaled
its solidarity (in word and action) with President Nicolás Maduro and
remains the external state actor most relevant to the trajectory of the
Maduro regime.18

Compound Security Threats and the Limits of American
Unilateral Power

Our current systems and methods of calculating risks and
force requirements do not fully nor adequately account for these
“compounding” dynamics. As a result, our determinations of risk and
force requirements are anemic, setting conditions for a “too little . . . too
16. Don Giolzetti, “China’s Front Door to America’s Backyard: China’s Rising Influence in
Panama is a Case Study of Its Ambitions in Latin America,” Diplomat, June 28, 2019, https://
thediplomat.com/2019/06/chinas-front-door-to-americas-backyard/.
17. Hearing to Receive Testimony on United States Africa Command and United States Southern Command
in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2021 and the Future Years Defense Program:
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 116th Cong. (January 30, 2020) (Testimony of
Admiral Craig S. Faller, Commander, US Southern Command), https://www.armed-services.senate
.gov/imo/media/doc/20-02_01-30-2020.pdf.
18. “Russia to Boost Venezuela Ties amid US Pressure,” BBC, February 8, 2020, https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-51423110; and John E. Herbst and Jason Marczak,
Russia’s Intervention in Venezuela: What’s at Stake?, Atlantic Council, September 12, 2019,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/russias-intervention-in
-venezuela-whats-at-stake/.
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late . . . and not enough for long enough” approach to global transregional
threats to national and hegemonic interests.19 Certainly the convergence
of threats at key geographic locations presents the United States with
additional challenges, but it also presents opportunities to sharpen our
focus and apply our resources in more precise and economical ways, at
decisive locations, through simultaneously executed named operations
and enduring efforts, creating the possibility of achieving overmatching
compound wins.
In short America can no longer go it alone, nor should it. As the cases
discussed illustrate, the United States has a power problem consisting of
three components: (1) insufficient power, type, and kind; (2) insufficient
capacity to produce, maintain, and sustain the power required to meet
contemporary missions; and (3) insufficient capability to convert power
available (on hand or in production) into effective policies and strategies.
Again, the anemic public policy handling of the COVID-19 pandemic
is a sad testimonial to these facts. The United States has reached the
limits of its fungible power, at least from a perspective of single-select
instrumental or unilateral choice.
America remains an exceptional nation in terms of its relative
capabilities and capacity to rival nation-states and in its ability to project
power globally. But like a boxer replete with years of experience and
a reach that outdistances younger, less-experienced competitors, the
“tale of the tape” for the United States today might read: “great reach,
but poor endurance in the latter rounds.” America retains the ability to
reach anywhere and everywhere, but frequently with the wrong kind
of instrument and too little of the right-fitting solution set. America
often arrives too late to prevent, contain, or mitigate today’s compound
security threats or does not sustain the longevity needed for effective
regimens. All told, this is a worrisome combination. There is a point of
diminishing returns that all great powers must face in relation to their
ability to expand, manage, and govern imperial dominions. As historian
Paul Kennedy noted:
Nations project their military power according to their economic resources
and in defense of their broad economic interests. But, the cost of projecting
that military power is more than even the largest economies can afford
indefinitely, especially when new technologies and new centers of production
shift economic power away from established Great Powers—hence the rise
and fall of nations.20

We still live an international relations paradigm that privileges the
sovereignty of individual nation-states, within which states retain the
right to make their own policy choices. But exercising the sovereign
right to determine one’s own art of the possible independently does
not change the nature of threats nor the character of change in global
geopolitical, geo-economic, and geostrategic competition. If the policy
19. See Isaiah Wilson III, “Introduction to the Politics of Defence Planning,” in Wilson and
Forrest, Handbook of Defence Politics, 9.
20. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from
1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), jacket.
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choice is unilateralism and self-help, the risk calculations of such choices
must be measured against the changed and changing environment. In an
era where that environment—foreign and domestic—is governed more
by a new compound security dilemma, the risk of continuing to choose
public policies of unilateral self-help will prove beyond the calculus of
risks itself—more the stuff of a gamble.
So what might come of an “America First” foreign policy? History
provides examples of the consequences of adopting purely transactional
approaches: uncertainty, strategic mis-signals and misreads, and illiberal
solutions and outcomes that while perhaps instrumentally beneficial and
successful in achieving and securing short-range strategic goals, wind
up being devoid of a moral footing of the kind needed to secure lasting,
durable, legitimate peace and stability in the longer run.

Implications for Military Strategy and Force Planning

Compound security threats represent a change in the character,
scope, and scale of challenges to our common defense and public welfare.
While hybridity is certainly part of the equation, it is not all of it. The
compounded nature of today’s and tomorrow’s threats dramatically alters
our public policy and force planning, sizing, and shaping calculations
and algorithms.
As former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, speaking to
US troops in Kuwait in December 2004 said, “‘you go to war with the
army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later
time.’”21 Unfortunately, these remarks echo our reality today, a reality
largely of our own making. At the same time, we too often hear this
expression offered as an epiphenomenal excuse for failures of imagination,
anticipation, forecasting, and planning, and for our underpreparedness
for the fullness of contemporary public policy puzzles.
Addressing these failures will require our entire national security
enterprise to come to grips with a recurring set of behaviors that cuts
across our checkered performance against compound threats:
•• The phenomenon and paradox within the social constructions
of the meanings of war and peace, the issues of security and
nonsecurity, and the tendency to win a war but to lose the intended
peace, as evidenced by our decades-long anabasis in Iraq
•• The false distinction between national security and human
security issues, as demonstrated by US-led military-humanitarian
interventions in the 1990s, which addressed only symptoms but
not root causes (Somalia, Kosovo, Haiti)
•• The persistence of chronic, civil-societal, government-society
structural inequalities that go un- or under-addressed for many
reasons yet remain the common denominator of rebellions,
21. Eric Schmitt, “Iraq-Bound Troops Confront Rumsfeld over Lack of Armor,” New York
Times, December 8, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/08/international/middleeast
/iraqbound-troops-confront-rumsfeld-over-lack-of.html.
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insurrections, and insurgencies (Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, the
Arab Spring)
•• The tendency to declare false or premature victories while a
conflict is evolving, not ending; the “mission accomplished”
paradox results in undercounts in risk assessments and capability
requirements calculations (Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, COVID-19)

Furthermore, as Amitai Etzioni, author of From Empire to Community:
A New Approach to International Relations (2004), once reminded us,
“Whether one is highly critical of the American global projection of
power or celebrates that the United States has accepted that it is destined
to bring order and liberty to the world. . . . [The question is:] Where
do we go from here?”22 Indeed, we need to think and move in more
comprehensive, multilateral, and communitarian ways and directions.
If our power equation can neither muster nor sustain the type, quality,
and quantities of force we need or dispatch it in ways and according
to timelines necessary to achieve overmatch of compound threats as
they form, or at least before they compound, then we need a whole
new equation.
Our new equation will require novel frameworks and mental models
by which the United States, as part of a global effort, can plan, lead,
and organize solutions to compound security threats. A theory and an
analytics-informed, multilayer, network model (see figure 2) capable of
capturing the interactions of the drivers behind compound problems,
both horizontally and vertically, between separate ecosystems, could
have significant utility.

Figure 2. “Key concepts and dominant interpretations of power relevant to
polycentric environmental governance” by T. H. Morrison et al., is licensed
under CC BY 4.023

22. Amitai Etzioni, From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004), 1.
23. See T. H. Morrison et al., “The Black Box of Power in Polycentric Environmental
Governance,” Global Environmental Change 57 (July 2019): art. 101934, fig. 2, https://doi.org/10.1016
/j.gloenvcha.2019.101934.
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Such an approach might just be the moment of paradigm shift
that many within military, public policy, and public affairs circles have
debated, even promoted, for at least the last three decades. The 2020
novel coronavirus pandemic may be its herald. If so, will we recognize it
and heed its call for the whole-cloth change it requires?
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